Summary of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice By David Galula Summary written by Brett Reeder, Conflict Research Consortium Citation: Galula, . WARFARE. Theory and Practice. David Galula. Foreword by John A. Nagl. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Praeger Security International. Westport. operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and. Practice, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN.

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That is, the support of the people is the primary objective of a counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed, a counterinsurgency exists only in reaction to an insurgency.

Views Read Edit View history. The older soldier imparted an intellectual approach to military and geopolitical analysis.

Summary of “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”

His strategy is divided into eight steps: Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. They can act directly on the insurgent leaders, they can act indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency, they can infiltrate the insurgent movement, or they can reinforce their own “Political Machine”. His strategy is divided into eight steps:. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Keeping this emphasis on political action and the laws of counterinsurgency in mind, Galula develops a comprehensive strategy for dealing effectively with hot insurgencies.

The final option, strengthening or building the gallula machine” of the state, consists of convincing the population to buy into the state’s legitimacy and moral authority. He distinguished himself by applying personal tactics in counterinsurgency to his sector of Kabylieat Djebel Mimoun, [5] near Tigzirteffectively eliminating the nationalist insurgency in his sector and earning accelerated promotion from this point.

According to Galula, this coordination can be achieved through committees and integrated military-civilian hierarchies but, “more than anything else, a doctrine appears to be the practical answer to the problem of how to channel efforts in a single direction” p Galula’s work on counter-insurgency is in large part based on the experiences and lesson of years of French colonial warfare, most notably the work of Joseph-Simon Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey.

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However, he cautions gaoula the lessons of this book do not guarantee success and that, “As long as the revolutionary situation exists, even in a dormant form, as long as the problem that gave rise to the insurgency has not been eliminated, the danger persists” p Indeed ,as Galula put it, “Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.

With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control:.

In some ways, this aids a counterinsurgency because the “moral fog” surrounding the insurgents dissipates and the counterinsurgency is free to act more decisively.

Win over or suppress counterinsurrgency last insurgent remnants. Such direct action should only be attempted when the insurgent’s cause in not popular, the counterinsurgent has the legal authority to act, and significant publicity of such action can be prevented. To do so, it is necessary to keep a single static or holding force in place. Such support is most readily obtained from an active minority.

In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. Further, the counterinsurgency must learn and adapt as it goes along.

Counterinsurgency Warfare by David Galula – Praeger – ABC-CLIO

It is still considered by many to be the “Bible” of counterinsurgency warfare. While insurgencies often fail on their own accord, “Relying on luck Each of the steps is to be undertaken in a specific area consistent with the fourth law and then repeated in other areas as necessary.

Counterinsurgency “in the Heat” As soon as an insurgent’s activities become openly illegal and violent, it is considered “hot”. Theory and Practice is highly suggested reading for students of the U. Rather, action should be taken in select areas, and resources moved as needed.

The “Laws” According to Galula, there are four waffare of counterinsurgency.

Check out our Quick Start Guide or Galupa. New to the site? Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support of the active leaders. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots.


Counterinsurgency Warfare, David Galula | Brendan Kelly –

Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerillas. Acting directly on insurgent leaders arresting them, or limiting their actions is difficult in democracies and often backfires. Links to quality news, opinion pieces, and reports that explain the intractable conflict problem and highlight successful responses.

Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.

David Galula

Such programs are often based on reason, and will be relatively ineffective in the early stages of an insurgency when “passion is the prime mover,” but as the conflict progresses and the pragmatic implications of the war become the “the prime counterinsugrency rational programs which improve the lives of the populace will become highly persuasive. At the heart of this political machine is the development of a counterinsurgent cause to compete with the insurgent cause.

Galula’s wife recalled that her husband went to China to follow Guillermaz, who was, “without a doubt, the most influential person in David’s life. Don’t glula upcoming posts, signup for the Newsletter. While a revolution is a sudden and “accidental” mass movement and a plot or coup is an intentional effort to overthrow the cointerinsurgency leadership in a swift action, an insurgency is intentional, but not swift.

Galula’s laws thus take at face value and recognize the importance of the aphorism, based on the ideas of Mao, that “The people are the sea in which the revolutionary swims.

The first law is that the population is paramount. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.

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